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The Consequences of Dual and Unilateral Commitment: Evidence from the Health Service

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The Consequences of Dual and Unilateral Commitment: Evidence from the Health Service

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the pattern and consequences of commitment to organisation and union amongst union members in a UK National Health Service (NHS) Trust. Those who perceived the industrial relations climate as positive were more likely to be dually committed to both organisation and union. As anticipated, union commitment predicted union citizenship behaviours and intent to quit the union. However, organisational commitment predicted intent to quit the organisation but not organisational citizenship behaviour, which was predicted by union commitment. Findings suggest that those with a unilateral commitment to the union are more likely than the dually committed to engage in citizenship behaviours aimed at helping fellow members and colleagues, perhaps because they feel unconstrained by any strong loyalty to the organisation.

1. INTRODUCTION

There is now a sizeable literature on employees' commitment to their employer and to their union, with studies on the antecedents of organisational (company/employer) and union commitment (e.g. Barling et al. 1990; Fukami and Larsen 1984; Fullagar and Barling 1991), and on the possibility of employees being dually committed to both (e.g. Angle and Perry 1986; Fullagar and Barling 1991; Magenau et al. 1988). The findings suggest that, in spite of the possibility that commitment to employer and union might be considered as conflicting, dual loyalty is very common, particularly where the climate of employee relations is relatively harmonious. However, very little research has been conducted on the possible consequences of dual commitment, and Gordon and Ladd (1990) argue that it is as an antecedent that the significance of dual commitment must ultimately be assessed. Furthermore, much of the commitment literature has been North American and very few studies have been conducted in the UK, with the rare exception of Guest and Dewe (1991).

In this paper, our aims are twofold. First, we explore the pattern of commitment to organisation and union amongst union members in a UK National Health Service (NHS) Trust. Our concern is with the extent to which the two commitments can be seen as competing or complementary, and we provide some UK evidence in an area dominated by North American studies. Second, we examine the consequences of commitment for employee attitudes and behaviour, including intentions to quit the organisation and the union, and the performance of organisational and union citizenship behaviours. A key question is whether or not dual commitment adds anything to our understanding of attitudes and behaviour, independently of commitment to company and union (Gordon and Ladd 1990;

Bemmels 1995). Further understanding of the role of dual commitment is important, as the fostering of dual commitment can be seen as an objective of recent industrial relations developments in the UK, such as the introduction of formal partnership agreements in the workplace, a development which has been especially prominent in the NHS (Heaton et al. 2000; 2002). The paper begins with a brief survey of the literature on dual commitment. We then present our empirical work, before drawing some conclusions and discussing the implications of our findings.

2. LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES

Commitment to organisation and to union.

Organisational commitment has been defined as the ‘binding of an individual to an organisation’ (Gordon et al. 1980: 480), and is usually measured as an attitude involving a sense of identification and loyalty. This ‘attitudinal’ approach to commitment may be distinguished from ‘behavioural’ commitment, the latter involving the individual becoming bound to the organisation due to sunk investments and ‘side bets’ in the employment relationship. The attitudinal approach has received the greater attention in the commitment literature overall. The union commitment literature has essentially transferred the notion of organisational commitment into a union context (Gordon et al. 1980).

It might be expected that commitment to organisation and to union would be a source of role conflict, involving cognitive dissonance, particularly if union and employer are seen to be in conflict (Festinger 1957). The behaviours expected of the committed union member, including actively supporting the union and perhaps participating in industrial action from time to time, may bring the individual into conflict with the employer. At the very least, the individual may face a choice in

allocating time and energy to behaviours that express support for the union or the organisation.

However, the evidence suggests that many individuals are highly committed both to their union and their employer, a phenomenon known as ‘dual allegiance’, ‘dual loyalty’ or ‘dual commitment’ (e.g. Stagner 1954; Angle and Perry 1986; Fullagar and Barling 1991; Magenau et al. 1988). Two main approaches have been adopted in the measurement of dual commitment (Sverke and Sjöberg 1994; Gordon and Ladd 1990). The ‘dimensional approach’ is based on the assessment of the correlation between organisational and union commitment, with dual commitment being evidenced by a positive correlation (Angle and Perry 1986; Conlon and Gallagher 1987, Johnson and Johnson 1992). Most studies have found a positive correlation, although a few have found a small negative correlation. Reed et al.’s (1994) meta-analysis of 76 samples found correlations ranging from -0.25 to $+0.77$, with a mean corrected correlation of $+0.42$. Similarly, Fuller and Hester’s (1998) meta-analysis of 22 samples found correlations ranging from -0.26 to $+0.72$.

The ‘taxonomic approach’ to dual commitment categorises individuals into four groups: dual allegiance (with high levels of commitment to both organisation and union), unilateral allegiance to either organisation or union, and dual disallegiance (low commitment to both). The criteria for splitting the sample varies across studies. Splitting at the median is common, although this results in sample-specific quadrants, which prevents meaningful comparisons across samples. An alternative is to split the sample at the ‘neutral’ scale mid-points. A less common approach is to perform a cluster analysis. The choice of approach is essentially an arbitrary one and some studies apply alternative bifurcation methods and then assess the impact on the results (e.g., Sverke and Sjöberg 1994).

Industrial relations climate and commitment.

Organisational and union commitment have generally been found to have different antecedents (e.g., Deery and Iverson 1998; Sverke and Sjöberg 1994; Sherer and Morishima 1989). Individuals may perceive separate exchanges with employer and union, so that organisational and union commitment are the outcome of parallel rather than competing processes (Johnson and Johnson 1992). Thus, findings suggest that organisational commitment is influenced by perceptions of the job, and union commitment by perceptions of the union's performance (Ng 1989; Magenau et al. 1988).

Some studies find a positive relationship between perceived industrial relations climate and commitment to both employer and union (Angle and Perry 1986), suggesting that dual commitment may be a feature of harmonious industrial relations. Thus, when management-union relations are seen to be positive, employees may find it easier to commit to both organisation and union, although these commitments may be seen as being become inconsistent where relations between the two are antagonistic. This is in line with Festinger's (1957) notion of cognitive dissonance, with the two commitments constituting dissonant cognitive elements. Cognitive dissonance is seen as a state of negative arousal, the reduction of which is likely to be gratifying. Thus, where union and organisation are seen to be in conflict, dual commitment is likely to give rise to attempts to reduce the degree of dissonance, perhaps by abandoning commitment to one or other.

This suggests the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Dual commitment to organisation and union will be more prevalent amongst those individuals who perceive the industrial relations climate to be positive.

The consequences of organisational and union commitment.

There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that organisational commitment is associated with lower levels of intent to quit and with higher levels of discretionary or citizenship behaviour (Meyer, et al. 2002;. Mathieu and Zajac 1990). Similarly, union commitment has been shown to predict active participation in the union (Bamberger et al. 1999), and intent to quit the union (Snape and Chan 2000; Sverke and Sjöberg 1995; Goslinga and Sverke 2003).

One possible rationale for such relationships is that the individual employee/member enjoys a social exchange relationship with both employer and union, which is reflected in commitment and reciprocated in the form of discretionary citizenship behaviour and an intent to continue the relationship (Organ 1990). However, work on multiple commitments suggests that reciprocation is likely to be aimed at the specific exchange partner (McNeely and Meglino 1994; Settoon et al. 1996; Siders et al. 2001), such that commitment to the employer results in discretionary behaviours likely to benefit the employer, whilst union commitment results in discretionary behaviours likely to benefit the union. Thus, we formulate the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2: Organisational commitment is a). negatively associated with intention to quit the organisation and b). positively associated with organisational citizenship behaviour.

Hypothesis 3: Union commitment is a). negatively associated with intention to quit the union and b). positively associated with union citizenship behaviour.

The consequences of dual commitment.

Much of the research has examined the extent of dual commitment and has explored the factors which might predict its existence. However, a key question which has been relatively neglected in the literature is the extent to which dual commitment predicts attitudes and behaviours (Gordon and Ladd 1990). The suggestion is that if dual commitment is a unique construct, independent of organisational and union commitment, then ‘...it would have additive effects beyond commitment to an employer or a union on desirable behaviors and organisational outcomes’ (Bemmels 1995: 401). The suggestion is that employees who express dual commitment may be expected to show attitudes and behaviours which are favourable to both employer and union.

Bemmels (1995) provides a test of this. Modelling dual commitment as an interaction term between the union and organisational commitment variables, the findings suggest that dual commitment predicts shop steward behaviour (the frequency with which the steward resolves grievances through informal discussion with the supervisor), and grievance procedure outcomes (the percentage of grievances filed which were resolved during the year), after controlling for the possible main effects of the two commitments. In each case, the interaction suggests that dual commitment is associated with a higher level of the steward behaviour/ outcome in question. Thus, according to Bemmels (1995), dual commitment emerges as a distinct construct, with independent predictive power, explaining variance over and above that explained by union and organisational commitment.

In contrast, Deery and Iverson (1998), in their study of an Australian financial services company, find that dual commitment, measured by a development of Angle and Perry's (1986) direct measure of dual commitment, is a significant predictor of none of their organisational outcomes. This is in spite of the fact that such outcomes were predicted by organisational and union commitment, suggesting that the dual commitment construct has no independent explanatory power. The divergent findings between the Bemmels (1995) and Deery and Iverson (1998) studies may be due to their having measured dual commitment differently or to their being based on very different samples. Clearly, the relationship between dual commitment and outcomes is in need of further examination.

The Angle and Perry (1986) direct measure of dual commitment is a five-item scale, which attempts to tap into potential employee-union member role conflict and the extent to which management and union are perceived as being non-conflictual, with high dual commitment being represented by a perception of low conflict. However, attempting to measure dual commitment separately, as essentially perceived conflict, rather than as a function of the two unilateral commitment scales is perhaps inappropriate and arguably redundant (Bemmels 1995). There may also be reliability problems in the Angle and Perry (1986) scale. Whilst the original study reported an alpha of 0.71, Deery and Iverson's (1998) adaptation of the scale had a reliability coefficient of only 0.63, and that used by Beauvais et al. (1991) had alphas of only 0.51 and 0.44 in their two samples. Furthermore, Beauvais et al. (1991) questioned the validity of the scale as a measure of dual commitment, suggesting that it reflects union rather than dual commitment.

Given the above concerns, in this study we follow the suggestions of both Gordon and Ladd (1990) and Bemmels (1995) in measuring dual commitment as an

interaction between the organisational and union commitment scales. We also suggest that dual commitment will emerge as a unique construct, explaining variance in outcomes over and above that explained by organisational and union commitment (Gordon and Ladd 1990; Bemmels 1995).

The question then arises as to what will be the expected sign of such effects. Following Bemmels (1995), we might expect that commitment to one focus (e.g., the organisation) would reinforce the effect of commitment to the other focus (e.g., the union) on relevant outcomes (e.g., intent to quit the union and union citizenship behaviours). A possible rationale for such moderation effects is that dual commitment is associated with cognitive consistency between the roles of employee and union member (Magenau et al. 1988), such that outcome behaviours are engaged in relatively free from fears of compromising either role. However, it is also plausible to suggest the reverse effect, with dual commitment making individuals more cautious about being identified too strongly with either organisation or union. For example, the impact of union commitment on union citizenship behaviour may be weaker for those who also have high levels of organisational commitment, if such individuals fear that being seen as a union activist offends the employer.

Given this ambiguity about the possible direction of any moderator effects, rather than formulating a specific directional hypothesis, we offer the following research question:

Research question: How does dual commitment effect organisational and union citizenship behaviours and intentions to quit the organisation and union?

3. METHOD

Sample and procedure.

A self-completion questionnaire was distributed to all 1,560 employees of a NHS Trust serving a diverse rural population in North East England. To ensure confidentiality the questionnaire was returned direct to the researchers in a reply-paid envelope. By the cut-off date, 707 useable responses were received, providing a response rate of 45 percent. The sample was occupationally diverse, with 38 percent of the respondents nurses, 16 percent professional and professions allied to medicine, and seven percent doctors. In total, 66 percent were members of a union. In this paper, we restrict our analysis to union members. In the union member sub-sample, mean health service and union tenure were 16.29 and 14.47 years respectively. The modal age range was 40 to 49, accounting for 33.6 percent of the sub-sample, 84.8 percent were female, 81.3 percent were married/living as married and 27.6 percent had degree-level education. The sample was broadly representative of the Trust's overall workforce, for example, with 84 percent of all employees being women. Union representatives estimated trade union density for the Trust at approximately two-thirds of the work force, which is broadly in line with average union density figure for the UK public sector as a whole (TUC 2003).

Measures.

The study variables were measured as follows. Unless mentioned otherwise, responses were on a seven-point scale from 'strongly disagree' (1) to 'strongly agree' (7). Union commitment was measured with seven items, reflecting a single affective dimension, based on shared values, and a sense of identity, belonging, and pride. For example: 'What the union stands for is important to me', and 'I feel a strong sense of

belonging to the union'. Organisational commitment (i.e. to the employer, the NHS Trust) was measured using Meyer and Allen's (1997) six-item affective commitment scale. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of the organisational and union commitment items, which suggested that the two scales had discriminant validity. Thus, a two-factor model, with separate organisational and union commitment factors, produced a superior fit to the one-factor model, although the fit was only moderate (2-factor model: $X^2 = 312.477$; $df = 64$; GFI = 0.889; AGFI = 0.841; CFI = 0.887; RMSEA = 0.097; 1-factor model = 1144.517; $df = 65$; GFI = 0.614; AGFI = 0.460; CFI = 0.510; RMSEA = 0.201. Change in $X^2 = 832.040$; change in $df = 1$; $p < 0.01$). In the two-factor solution, all indicators loaded significantly ($p < 0.001$) on their latent variables.

Perceived IR climate reflects the extent to which relations between management and rank and file workers are seen as mutually trusting, respectful and co-operative, and was measured with six items from Hammer et al. (1991). For example: 'Staff and management distrust one another' (reversed), and 'Staff and management respect each other'.

Potential organisational outcomes were measured as follows. Intention to quit the Trust was measured with four items, for example: 'I often think of quitting this job', and 'It is likely that I will look for another job during the next year'.

Organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB), including 'altruism' and 'compliance' dimensions, was measured with 10 items based on those of Smith et al. (1983).

Responses were made on a five-point scale, 'never' (1) to 'always' (5). An exploratory factor analysis of these items, with varimax rotation, revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 62 percent of total variance. One item was dropped because it had a secondary loading within 0.2 of the primary

leading. A re-analysis with the remaining 9 items produced a similar two-factor structure, accounting for 64 percent of total variance. The items designed to measure compliance loaded on the first factor (five items, for example: 'Suggest ways to reduce waste'; 'Make innovative suggestions to improve work procedures'). The remaining items loaded on the second factor, and were those designed to measure altruism (four items, for example: 'Help new people settle into the job'; 'Take time to listen to work colleagues problems or worries'). OCB compliance and altruism variables were formed by averaging across the five and four items respectively.

Potential union outcomes were measured as follows. Intent to quit the union was measured with two items: 'I often think about leaving my union and joining another union', and 'I often think about not being a union member at all'. Union citizenship behaviour is concerned with members' extra-role behaviours, and was measured as a response to the question: 'Think about how you behave in relation to the union and your work colleagues. When the opportunity arises, how often do you do each of the following?' Respondents were then presented with 13 items, responding on a five-point scale: 'never' (1) to 'always' (5). The items were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis, with oblique rotation. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one, accounting for 72 percent of variance. Three items were removed because of significant cross loadings, leaving ten items to be re-analysed. Three factors again emerged, identical to the initial analysis except for the deleted items, and accounting for 75 percent of total variance. Four items loaded heavily on the first factor, relating to activist forms of union citizenship behaviour: speaking at and attending union meetings, volunteering to be a union official, committee member or delegate, and reading a union journal or magazine. Three items loaded on the second factor, including relating to providing advice to work colleagues on union-

related matters, problems and grievances, and helping them put their case to management. We refer to these as union helping behaviours. Finally, three items loaded on a third factor: attending a rally or demonstration, voting in union elections and speaking well of the union to colleagues. Whilst the first of these might well be time-consuming for the member, we nevertheless interpret these as actions which might be expected of a rank-and-file union member, given that there is no leadership role implied. Union citizenship behaviour variables for ‘union activism’, ‘union helping’, and ‘union rank & file’ were formed by averaging across these four, three and three items respectively.

4. RESULTS

Means, standard deviations, correlations and alphas for the study variables are shown in table 1. Alphas are generally at acceptable levels, with only that for intent to quit the union marginally below 0.7.

Organisational commitment and union commitment are not significantly correlated (correlation coefficient = +0.065; $p = 0.189$ on a 2-tail test). This suggests that loyalty to the union does not necessarily imply disloyalty to the Trust. However, the lack of a significant positive correlations does not necessarily mean that there is no evidence of dual commitment (Gordon and Ladd 1990). A taxonomic analysis split the samples into four categories, taking the mean value of organisational and union commitment as the split points (table 2). Those with above average commitment to both are categorised as dual loyalists, those with below average commitment on both are dual disaffecteds, and those with above average on one or other commitment are classified as Trust or Union loyalists accordingly.

The analysis for all union members shows a fairly equal distribution across the four taxons, perhaps with slightly more classified into the dual disaffected category. However, almost a quarter (23 percent) fall into the dual commitment category, defined as those with above average commitment to both Trust and to their union. In order to test hypothesis 1, we conducted an analysis according to individuals' perceptions of the IR climate, again splitting the sample at the mean. Those who perceive a relatively negative IR climate are grouped mainly into either the dual disaffected or union loyalist categories. Those with more positive perceptions of the IR climate are grouped mainly into the dual loyalty and trust loyalist categories. Thus, hypothesis 1, which anticipates that dual commitment will be more prevalent amongst those individuals who perceive the industrial relations climate to be positive, is supported.

The results of the hierarchical regression analysis for all union members is shown in table 3. Organisational commitment is negatively associated with intent to quit the trust, as predicted by hypothesis 2a. However, contrary to hypothesis 2b, there is no association between organisational commitment and the two dimensions of OCB, compliance and altruism. Rather, altruism and compliance are positively associated with *union* commitment. Union commitment is negatively associated with intent to quit the union, as expected in hypothesis 3a, and positively associated with all three dimensions of UCB (helping, rank & file, and activism), as expected in hypothesis 3b.

Looking now at our research question, concerning the incremental contribution of dual commitment, the only significant interaction term in table 3 is for union helping, and in this case there is a *negative* moderating effect. This is plotted in figure 1. This suggests that higher levels of organisational commitment are associated

with a less strongly positive relationship between union commitment and union helping behaviour.

We also conducted separate regressions for members of the two largest unions in our sample, the Royal College of Nursing (RCN) and UNISON. The regression results for RCN members are shown in table 4. Intent to quit the Trust is negatively predicted by commitment to the Trust, with neither union commitment nor the interaction term significant. However, neither dimension of organisational citizenship behaviour, compliance nor altruism, are significantly predicted by either of the commitment variables or by the interaction term. As regards union citizenship behaviours, those aimed at helping fellow members are predicted by union commitment, and there is a significant negative interaction, similar to that found in the full sample regression. Both rank & file and activist forms of pro-union behaviour are positively predicted by union commitment, with no significant effects from organisational commitment or from the interaction. Finally, intent to quit the union is negatively predicted by union commitment only.

The results for UNISON members are included in table 5. These findings are broadly similar to those for the full sample and RCN analyses. Again, intent to quit the Trust is predicted by commitment to the Trust. Compliance and altruism are predicted by commitment to neither the organisation nor the union, although this time there is a significant negative interaction effect in the case of altruism. Again, there is a significant negative interaction in the case of behaviours aimed at helping fellow members; and union commitment is significant. Union commitment also predicts rank & file and activist behaviours. Again, intent to quit the union is negatively predicted by union commitment.

5. DISCUSSION

Whilst organisational and union commitment were not significantly correlated, we did find evidence of dual commitment in our taxonomic analysis. Furthermore, consistent with hypothesis 1, dual commitment was more in evidence amongst those who perceived the IR climate as being positive. A positive IR climate was also associated with a higher proportion of Trust loyalists and lower proportions of union loyalists and dual disaffecteds. This pattern suggests that whilst a positive IR climate favours the development of dual commitment, any perceived deterioration in IR climate is likely to result primarily in a decline in organisational rather than in union commitment.

Turning to the consequences of commitment, our findings suggest that union citizenship behaviours and intent to quit the union are largely a reflection of union commitment. However, whilst organisational commitment predicts intent to quit, organisational citizenship behaviours seem not to reflect organisational commitment, and in the full sample it is commitment to the union rather than to the organisation which predicts the OCB dimensions of compliance and altruism. Certainly, there is no suggestion in our findings that union and employer necessarily compete for the commitment and extra-role participation of individuals, in that commitment to the one does not necessarily involve reduced levels of citizenship behaviour for the other.

We formulated an open research question on the effects of dual commitment. One possibility was a positive interaction effect between organisational and union commitment in the case of organisational and union citizenship behaviours, based on a cognitive consistency interpretation of dual commitment (Magenau et al. 1988), whilst a negative effect was also possible. In the event, the only significant interactions were *negative* for union helping in the full sample, RCN and UNISON

analyses, and for altruism in the UNISON analysis only. These interactions suggest that higher levels of organisational commitment are associated with a less strongly positive relationship between union commitment and OCBs aimed at helping fellow members and colleagues, for example advising colleagues on their problems and helping them put their case to management. One way to interpret these findings is to suggest that those with a unilateral commitment to the union are particularly likely to participate in such behaviours, because they feel unconstrained by any strong loyalty to the organisation. In contrast, some of the dually committed may wish to avoid such potentially partisan union behaviours for fear that they signal disloyalty to the organisation. Not surprisingly, the dual disaffecteds, with low levels of commitment to both union and organisation, show the lowest levels of helping.

Our findings are consistent with those of Bemmels (1995) in so far as they suggest that dual commitment has independent predictive power, and is thus a unique construct rather than an epiphenomenon. However, unlike Bemmels (1995) our findings suggests that this predictive power is negative rather than positive. This difference may be resolved by looking at the specific steward behaviours and outcomes for which a positive interaction effect was found in the Bemmels (1995) study. The two outcomes, ‘How often do you settle a potential grievance before it is filed by discussing the problem with the employee’s supervisor?’ (informal), and the percentage of filed grievances resolved by the year end (resolved), reflect a particularly cooperative approach to industrial relations. In contrast, the outcomes in our study, union helping and altruism, involve providing help to fellow employees, and do not necessarily imply the adoption of a cooperative approach. Indeed, such behaviours may even be indicative of a relatively militant attitude and approach on the part of the individual respondent.

Our findings provide no support for the suggestion that dually committed individuals will be better organisational or union citizens than their unilaterally committed colleagues. Indeed, there is counter evidence, with dual commitment being associated with lower levels of union helping and altruism than for those with strong unilateral commitment to the union. Our findings suggest that initiatives designed to build cooperative industrial relations and dual commitment to organisation and union, such as social partnership arrangements, will not necessarily lead to more active member participation in unions. On the contrary, the co-worker-focussed union helping behaviours appear likely to most developed under conditions of unilateral union commitment, which may be more prevalent where industrial relations are perceived by members to be less harmonious. This suggests that union militancy, rather than moderation, may be the most effective way for unions to win the active participation of their members. This is not to say that social partnership is necessarily a negative development. There may be other advantages to organizations, to their employees, and to unions. But what we are saying is that social partnership, to the extent that it builds more harmonious industrial relations and dual commitment, may undermine union helping and altruism, and so may be inconsistent with attempts to build a more activist, solidaristic form of workplace unionism.

Our findings are, of course, limited in that they are based on evidence from one particular NHS trust. The extent to which these findings can be generalised to other trusts, or more broadly to other sectors, requires further research. Furthermore, given that the central concern of this paper is with dual commitment, we have naturally focused on just two commitment foci - the union and the organisation. However, our failure to find a significant relationship between organisational commitment and OCB may be attributable to our having missed a commitment focus,

since OCB may be engaged in by employees in reciprocation for favourable consideration and treatment by their supervisor, co-workers, or clients rather than for support or favourable treatment by the organisation. Thus, future studies might include a wider range of potential commitment foci, including not only the supervisor, co-workers, and clients, but also those in the union domain, such as the local union representative /shop steward and the full-time officer.

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TABLE 1
Means, standard deviations, correlations and reliabilities for the study variables.

	Mean.	Standard deviation.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 Female	0.86	0.35	--										
2 Tenure	11.54	8.49	.05	--									
3 Part time	0.29	0.45	.17**	.06	--								
4 Temporary contract	0.19	0.39	.07	-.15**	.03	--							
5 Shiftworker	0.37	0.48	.05	-.11*	-.03	.07	--						
6 Organisational commitment	4.18	1.25	-.04	.19**	.00	-.02	-.07	.84					
7 Union commitment	4.63	0.92	-.02	.05	.02	.02	.01	.07	.86				
8 Intent to quit the Trust	3.41	1.63	-.04	-.05	-.07	.04	.13*	-.51**	-.02	.88			
9 OCB - Compliance	3.11	0.80	-.09	.15**	-.14**	-.09	-.15**	.13**	.11*	.03	.83		
10 OCB – Altruism	3.90	0.75	.01	.13**	-.20**	-.03	.18**	.07	.12*	.11*	.47**	.82	
11 Union OCB – Individual	1.87	0.96	-.12*	.18*	-.14**	-.03	-.04	.08	.29**	.04	.31**	.22**	.85
12 Union OCB – Rank & File	2.83	1.02	-.07	.07	-.08	-.06	-.05	.04	.59**	.01	.21**	.17**	.48**
13 Union OCB – Activist	1.50	0.87	-.14**	.08	-.09	-.13**	-.14**	.06	.41**	.01	.22**	.09	.56**
14 Intent to quit the union	2.31	1.23	-.02	-.06	.03	-.01	.00	.01	-.58**	.03	-.07	-.03	-.19**
15 IR climate	4.05	1.17	.02	-.06	.07	.00	-.05	.52**	.03	-.46**	.07	.01	-.01

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed tests).

Figures on diagonal are scale reliabilities.

Continued...

	12	13	14	15
<hr/>				
12 Union OCB – Rank & File	.73			
13 Union OCB – Activist	.55**	.89		
14 Intent to quit the union	-.44**	-.27**	.63	
15 IR climate	-.01	.00	-.01	.84

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (2-tailed tests), $N=414$.

Numbers on diagonal are scale reliabilities.

TABLE 2
Taxonomic analysis of commitment.

	Commitment to:		All union members.	By perceived IR climate:	
	The union	The Trust		Negative IR climate.	Positive IR climate.
Dual disaffecteds	Low	Low	120 (29%)	81 (39%)	39 (19%)
Trust loyalists	Low	High	106 (26%)	35 (17%)	71 (35%)
Union loyalists	High	Low	92 (22%)	66 (31%)	26 (13%)
Dual loyalists	High	High	96 (23%)	28 (13%)	68 (33%)

Note: The four taxons were derived by splitting the samples at the mean on the two commitments.
The analysis by perceived IR climate also splits at the mean.

TABLE 3
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: all union members.

	Intent to quit the Trust.	Compliance.	Altruism.	Union helping.	Union rank & file.	Union activism.	Intent to quit the union.
<i><u>Control variables:</u></i>							
Female	-0.06	-0.05	0.03	-0.08	-0.04	-0.11	-0.04
Tenure	0.08	0.12*	0.14**	0.10*	0.04	0.04	-0.04
Part time	-0.06	-0.15**	-0.22**	-0.15**	-0.09*	-0.09	0.04
Temporary contract	0.05	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07	-0.12**	-0.00
Shiftworker	0.10	-0.12*	0.19**	-0.03	-0.04	-0.12**	0.01
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.07**</i>	<i>0.10**</i>	<i>0.05**</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.06**</i>	<i>0.01</i>
<i><u>Commitment to:</u></i>							
Organisation	-0.52**	0.09	0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.01	0.06
Union	0.00	0.11*	0.12**	0.30**	0.60**	0.41**	-0.59**
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.26**</i>	<i>0.02*</i>	<i>0.02*</i>	<i>0.08**</i>	<i>0.35**</i>	<i>0.17**</i>	<i>0.34**</i>
<i><u>Interaction:</u></i>							
Commitment to organisation x commitment to union	0.04	-0.03	-0.09	-0.15**	-0.05	-0.04	-0.02
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>0.02**</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>
Final R ²	0.29	0.09	0.12	0.15	0.37	0.23	0.35
Adj R ²	0.27	0.07	0.10	0.13	0.36	0.21	0.34
F	20.30**	5.05**	6.91**	8.94**	29.80**	14.84**	27.13**

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01, N = 414.

TABLE 4
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: RCN members.

	Intent to quit the Trust.	Compliance.	Altruism.	Union helping.	Union rank & file.	Union activism.	Intent to quit the union.
<i><u>Control variables:</u></i>							
Female	-0.04	-0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.08
Tenure	0.10	0.15	0.19*	0.14	0.01	0.06	-0.06
Part time	-0.03	-0.14	-0.33**	-0.20**	-0.07	-0.10	0.04
Temporary contract	-0.07	-0.05	-0.00	-0.06	-0.07	-0.20**	-0.05
Shiftworker	0.08	-0.15	0.22**	0.03	-0.08	-0.14	0.08
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.03</i>	<i>0.07*</i>	<i>0.15**</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.03</i>	<i>0.07*</i>	<i>0.05</i>
<i><u>Commitment to:</u></i>							
Organisation	-0.63**	0.10	0.06	0.05	-0.03	-0.07	0.08
Union	0.03	-0.07	-0.03	0.16*	0.57**	0.27**	-0.47**
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.38**</i>	<i>0.01</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.29**</i>	<i>0.06**</i>	<i>0.22**</i>
<i><u>Interaction:</u></i>							
Commitment to organisation x commitment to union	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.26**	-0.05	-0.13	-0.07
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.07**</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.02</i>	<i>0.01</i>
Final R ²	0.41	0.08	0.16	0.13	0.32	0.14	0.28
Adj R ²	0.37	0.04	0.12	0.08	0.29	0.10	0.24
F	13.96**	1.81	3.76**	2.87**	9.50**	3.33**	7.58**

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01, N = 169.

TABLE 5
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: UNISON members.

	Intent to quit the Trust.	Compliance.	Altruism.	Union helping.	Union rank & file.	Union activism.	Intent to quit the union.
<i><u>Control variables:</u></i>							
Female	-0.27**	-0.09	-0.04	-0.41**	-0.24**	-0.34**	0.01
Tenure	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.07	0.02	0.02	-0.02
Part time	-0.00	-0.09	-0.14	-0.12	-0.10	-0.09	0.16*
Temporary contract	0.13	-0.04	-0.03	0.16*	-0.06	-0.07	0.05
Shiftworker	-0.01	-0.23*	0.15	-0.21**	-0.09	-0.14	0.01
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.29**</i>	<i>0.20**</i>	<i>0.24**</i>	<i>0.08</i>
<i><u>Commitment to:</u></i>							
Organisation	-0.49**	0.06	0.02	-0.04	-0.14	0.03	-0.01
Union	-0.07	0.19	0.16	0.29**	0.57**	0.41**	-0.60**
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.22**</i>	<i>0.04</i>	<i>0.05*</i>	<i>0.12**</i>	<i>0.31**</i>	<i>0.14**</i>	<i>0.31**</i>
<i><u>Interaction:</u></i>							
Commitment to organisation x commitment to union	-0.06	-0.07	-0.21*	-0.20*	-0.01	0.04	-0.02
<i>Change in R²</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.04*</i>	<i>0.03*</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>	<i>0.00</i>
Final R ²	0.29	0.12	0.17	0.44	0.50	0.37	0.39
Adj R ²	0.23	0.06	0.11	0.40	0.47	0.33	0.34
F	5.42**	1.84	2.70**	10.48**	13.67**	7.99**	8.54**

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01, N = 117.

FIGURE 1
Plot of interaction between union commitment
and organisational commitment on union helping.

